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MONOPOLY, INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION 







The relationship between inequality and redistribution is usually studied under the assumption 
that the government collects different amounts of taxes from each citizen (voter) but gives 
back the same amount (in cash or in kind) to everyone. In this paper we consider what 
happens if the government can redistribute through both sides of its budget (revenue and 
expenditure). We study the effects of inequality on the size (and structure) of redistributive 
programs in both perfectly competitive and monopolistic settings. We find that the presence 
of monopoly results in a higher tax rate than in the competitive case and that in the latter case 
an increase in inequality can be associated with a fall in the tax rate. We find also that 
although the median voter may not vote for a positive tax rate in the presence of public sector 
inefficiency under perfect competition, she may prefer – ceteris paribus – a positive tax rate in 
the presence of monopoly. 
JEL Code: H23, H42, P16. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the influential contributions of  Romer (1975), Meltzer and Richard (1981), 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), the conventional wisdom is that 
higher income inequality among voters leads to increased government redistribution. The 
intuition behind this result is that the greater is the gap between median and mean income, 
the higher will be the level of spending preferred by the median income voter and – since 
political competition drives policy decisions toward the ideal point of the median income 
voter – the higher will be the equilibrium amount of redistribution. Nevertheless, despite 
some empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis (see, Meltzer and Richard (1983), 
Milanovic (2000)), other empirical studies have not found that higher income inequality 
among voters leads to an increase in the size of redistributive programs (see, for example, 
Clarke (1995), Perotti (1996) and Rodriguez (1999)). This has led some (e.g., Benabou 
(1996) and Rodriguez (1999)) to urge the profession to take seriously the need to relax 
median voter assumptions in order to gain an understanding in variations in redistributive 
activity across countries and over time.  
 
Political scientists have long argued that unadulterated, fully participatory, median-voter 
democracy describes no actual political system – rather, the translation of resources into 
influence occurs in highly institutionalized environments that amplify some voices and mute 
others. Although we do not want to dispute the validity of this claim, in this paper we show 
that the median voter-framework can generate a more diverse set of outcomes once we take 
into account that redistribution is often effected through the public provision of private 
goods
1. Moreover, we demonstrate that if the assumption of perfect competition is relaxed 
                                                 
1 Other papers showing that there is not, necessarily, a divergence between theory  (based on the median-voter 
framework) and empirical evidence include Lee and Roemer (1999), Benabou (2000), Saint-Paul (2001) and 
Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001).   3 
(i.e., monopoly), the median-voter's preferred policy will involve -ceteris paribus- a higher 
tax rate than in the perfectly competitive case. We also find that the median voter will be 
willing to support redistributive policies under monopoly even when, due to public sector 
inefficiency, under perfectly competitive conditions the median voter would prefer no public 
provision. 
 
Our finding that the relationship between inequality and redistribution is not positive once we 
assume that redistribution is effected through the public provision of private goods is not 
novel. Indeed, Grossman (2003) has shown that higher inequality of capital endowments may 
reduce redistribution if the government uses the tax proceeds to finance public provision of a 
homogeneous good rather than (income) transfers. Both poor and rich households in 
Grossman's model have no choice other than consuming the freely-provided public good. In 
contrast, in the present paper  the government uses the tax proceeds to finance the provision 
of a rival public good which is also provided by the private sector, albeit at different quality 
levels – a vertically differentiated product (VDP) like health, education, or day care
2.  
Households are assumed to derive utility from the consumption of the VDP (either of the 
variety freely provided by the government or of one of the varieties offered by the private 
sector) and of a privately produced homogeneous product. We assume that both goods are 
rival in consumption. This implies that if a higher proportion of households decide to 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Our modeling follows Besley and Coate (1991) (see, also, Munro (1991), Boadway and Marchand (1995),  
Blomquist and Christiansen (1995, 1999), Thum and Thum (2002)) who used the idea that people with different 
incomes can value publicly provided goods differently, in order to show how public provision can induce self-
selection (e.g. only the poor choose to consume the relatively low quality of the good provided by the 
government - with the rich prefering to avail themselves of higher quality varieties which are privately supplied) 
and achieve redistribution with lower efficiency costs than if cash  transfers were used.  
   4 
“consume” the publicly provided variety, the quality provided by the public sector must 
decline. Thus, if in response to higher income inequality the median voter would otherwise 
have chosen to vote for a higher tax rate, she must now also take into account that a rise in 
the tax rate may induce a larger number of the more wealthy households to consume the 
publicly provided variety (since their after-tax income declines). Consequently, the rise in the 
tax rate may leave the median voter with lower after-tax income without a corresponding rise 
in the quality of the publicly-provided variety. As a result, the median voter may not prefer a 
rise in the tax rate as inequality increases. In fact, our results indicate that if the private VDP 
is produced under perfectly competitive conditions, the median voter equilibrium tax rate 
will depend negatively on the level of inequality. 
 
To our knowledge, the relationship between inequality and redistribution has been studied 
only under perfectly competitive settings. In this respect, the  more interesting results of our 
analysis relate to the presence of monopoly in the production of the VDP. We find that, first, 
the equilibrium tax rate will be higher under monopoly than in the perfectly competitive case, 
second, that the relationship between the equilibrium tax rate and inequality becomes hump-
shaped, and third, that the presence of monopoly can induce the median voter to prefer a 
positive tax rate, even in cases where the inefficiency of the public sector relative to the 
private sector is so large that the median voter would not vote for a positive tax rate under 
perfectly competitive conditions (i.e., the presence of monopoly can result in the public 
provision of private goods even in case of “government failure”). The explanation for the 
above results rests on the fact that the median voter realizes that the presence of – even an 
inefficient - public sector, in effect, allows her to avoid paying a price above marginal cost, 
and that the incomes of those consuming the privately (monopoly) supplied variety will be 
further at the upper-tail of the income distribution than in the perfectly competitive case.   5 
Consequently, the median voter expects that a rise in the tax rate will increase the number of 
households deciding to consume the publicly provided variety by a smaller number in the 
monopoly case –thus making the “congestion costs” of a higher tax rate smaller. 
 
Our finding that the relationship between the equilibrium tax rate and inequality becomes 
hump-shaped is driven by the positive impact of inequality on the mark-up of monopoly 
prices over cost.  At a high level of inequality, the mark-up of monopoly prices is such that 
only very high-income individuals will consume the privately-supplied variety. In that case, 
an increase in inequality will induce the median voter to choose a higher tax rate since the 
thinning tail of the income distribution ensures that the ‘redistribution’ effect of a tax rise is 
stronger than the implied ‘congestion’ effect. On the other hand, when inequality is low the 
monopoly prices are close to cost so that the relationship between inequality and taxes is 
similar to the perfectly competitive case.   
   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The basic model is described in section 2. The 
median voter equilibrium size of government is derived in section 3. Section 4 relaxes the 
assumption of perfect competition and introduces the case of monopoly. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
Consider a closed economy which produces and consumes two goods (X and Y) with the use 
of  labour. We assume that perfect competition prevails in all markets and that all households 
(citizens-cum-voters) are endowed with one unit of labor, which they offer inelastically. 
There are, however, differences in skill between households, which are reflected in 
differences in the endowment of each household’s effective labor supply. This is in turn 
reflected in differences in income across households. We assume that firms pay the same   6 
wage rate per effective unit of labor –thus the distribution of talent across firms does not 
affect unit production costs.  We will assume that the politico-economic equilibrium is 
determined according to the Downsian model of electoral competition.  
   
a. Firms 
Good X is a homogeneous good produced only by private sector firms under linear 
technology, 
          XL = ,                                                                                                                       (1) 
where Lstands for the effective units of labour used. Using labour as the numeraire, we get 
that the price of good X ,  X p , is unity.  
 
Good Y is a vertically differentiated good (VDP) which is produced at various quality levels 
in both the private and the public sector. We wish to capture the fact that, for many 
government-provided goods (or services), some citizens choose not to “consume” them (even 
though they are eligible for doing so and there is no price-tag attached to them), preferring 
instead to purchase them from the private sector. Typical examples of such publicly provided 
goods are health care, child care, old-age care and education. One reason for this 
phenomenon is that these goods are vertically differentiated according to quality (thus 
displaying large income elasticity) and there is a large degree of lumpiness associated with 
their consumption. For example, it is nearly impossible for a student to attend at the same 
time a public and a private educational institution (or to attend both part-time thus achieving 
a full-time status), or for a patient to have part of a heart operation at a public hospital and the 
rest of the operation at a private one. Moreover, in many cases it confers no extra utility (or it 
is detrimental) to supplement publicly provided goods with privately provided ones (i.e., first 
having an operation at a public hospital and afterwards supplementing it with another   7 
operation at a private hospital). Wealthy households will often elect to pay in order to avail 
themselves of the highest quality of these services – rather than be satisfied with the 
(sometimes) mediocre quality offered by the public sector.  
 
We assume that quality is measured by an index  0 Q > , and that there is complete 
information regarding the quality index. We further assume that for private sector firms 
average costs depend on quality and that, for any given quality level, the average cost is 
independent of the number of units produced. These assumptions are captured by the 
following production function, 
/ Q YLQ b =     1 b £ .                                                                                                              (2)   
In equation (2),   Q Y   denotes the number of units of quality Q produced. This particular 
specification implies that as quality increases more (effective) units of labour are required to 
produce each unit of the  Y good.  It also implies that the (average cost) and price at which 
each variety of the good will be offered is 
()() ACQPQQ b == .                                                                                                           (3) 
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the public sector uses a similar 
technology to produce the good,  pays the same wage rate, but for various reasons may be a 
less efficient producer than private sector firms
3. We capture this (potential) difference in 
efficiency between the private and the public sector by assuming that average costs in the 
public sector are  
()
G ACQQ =  , 
where the superscript G denotes the public sector.  
 
   8 
b. Households 
All households are assumed to have identical preferences. Following Rosen (1974) and 
Flam and Helpman (1987), we assume that the homogeneous good is divisible, whereas the 
quality-differentiated product is indivisible and households can consume only one unit of it.  
For simplicity - and with some loss of generality -  we write the utility function as
4 
iii UQX =  
where  i X  and  i Q stand for the quantity of the homogeneous good  and the quality of  good 
Y (the VDP) consumed by household i.  
 
Let  i e  stand for household’s  i endowment of effective number of labour units. Since the 
wage rate per effective units of labour is unity,  i e also stands for household income. We 
assume that there is a continuum of households, [ ] 0,1 i˛ , with Pareto distributed incomes. 
The Pareto distribution is defined over the interval  eb ‡ , and its CDF is  
          ()1(/),1
a Febea =-> .                                                                                            (4) 
Parameter  b stands for the lowest income, and parameter  adetermines the shape of the 
distribution (higher values of aimply greater equality). The Pareto distribution, in addition to 
being easy to work with, is a good approximation of actual income distributions. Empirical 
estimates of the value of  a range between 1.7 and 3.0 (see, Creedy (1977)). The mean of the 
Pareto distribution is equal to  
          /(1) aba m =- ,                                                                                                              (5) 
                                                 
 
 
3 The assumption that it may take more (efficiency) units of labour to produce any variety of the vertically-
differentiated product in the public sector may be justified on the grounds of imperfect monitoring which could 
be a result of the absence of competitive pressure  or due to the lack of transparency of property rights. 
4 The Cobb-Douglas utility function has the advantage – in addition to being easy to work with – that it 
produces results which are independent of the level of the economy’s average income. 
   9 
and the income of the median voter (household) is 
         1/ 2 a mb =  .                                                                                                                   (6) 
Since good Y is also offered by the public sector, and households can consume either a 
privately-provided variety or  the (single) variety provided by the government, in effect 
households face two m utually exclusive budget constraints. The budget constraint of  a 
household deciding to acquire a variety of Y which is offered by the private sector is 
        (1) () iiii X t ePQPXQX b - =+=+  , 
whereas, if the household chooses to consume the publicly (and freely) provided variety the 
budget constraint is, 
       (1) ii etX -=  , 
where  t stands for the income tax rate. Let 
G Q stand for the quality of good Y provided by 
the public sector. Then, if the household consumes a privately provided variety, the utility 
maximizing demands for   Q and  X  are (we assume that for all households income is high 
enough to generate positive demand for both goods), 
(1)/2 ii Qet b =-                                                                                                    (7) 
(1)/2 ii Xet =-                                                                                                                      (8)                                                                                                
whereas if the household consumes the publicly provided variety, the  entire disposable 
income of the household ( (1) i et =- ) is spent on  X .             
The resulting indirect utility of the household in the two cases is then, 
(1)/
P
ii Vetb =- ,         if it chooses a privately-offered variety,                                        (9)                         
(1)
GG
ii VetQ =-,       if it consumes the publicly-offered variety.                                    (10) 
We note that the difference between 
P
i V and 
G
i V is increasing in income (e).  Thus, only 
households with  large incomes will be willing to pass by the possibility of consuming for   10 
free the publicly provided variety and instead pay to acquire their preferred variety from the 
private sector. Let q denote the income of a household that is indifferent between consuming 
the publicly provided variety and its optimally chosen privately produced variety, i.e., for this 
household it holds that 
(1)/(1)
PGG VttQV qbq =-=-= .                                                                         (11) 
We term q  the dividing level of income (ability). Solving for q  we find that 
. 4/(1)
G Qt qb =-                                                                                                             (12) 
From the Pareto distribution we know that the proportion of households with incomes 
smaller or equal to  q  (that is, the proportion of households which choose to consume the 
publicly provided variety) is 
()1(/)
a Fb qq =- . 
Assuming that the government budget is kept in balance, we have that  
1(/)
aG tbQ mq Øø ºß =- .                                                                                                      (13)    
In equation (13) the left-hand-side stands for tax revenue and the right-hand-side for the cost 
of providing the Y good at quality 
G Q to all those wishing to consume it. Thus, the 
relationship between the tax rate and 
G Q depends on how many households consume the 











 .                                                                                         (14) 
   
3. Median-voter equilibrium 
 
In what follows we concentrate on the median voter (it can be easily established that all the 
conditions required for the median-voter theorem to apply are satisfied since the indirect   11 
utility function of each voter can be written in the form  (;)()()() ii VeJKeH qqq =+  where  
q is a vector of policies,  () i Ke is monotonic  in  i e , for any  ( ) H q and  () J q common to all 
voters, see Grandmont (1978) and Persson and Tabellini (2000)). In the politico-economic 
equilibrium considered in this paper, the median-voter chooses the tax rate and the quality 
level of the publicly-provided variety which are implemented by the policy maker. We 
conceive that the median voter realizes that her choice of the tax rate and the quality of the 
publicly-provided variety will affect the  proportion of households which will choose to 
consume the publicly provided good. 
Substituting equation (6)  into equations (9) and (10), we get that 
1/ 2(1)/
P
m Vbt a b =-,                                                                                                  (15) 
1/ 2(1)
GG
m VbtQ a =- ,                                                                                                 (16) 
Evidently, the median voter will not decide on a positive tax rate if at this tax rate she 
chooses to consume a privately provided variety (since in such a case would consent to a 
drop to her disposable income without the benefit of consuming the publicly provided 
variety)
5. Thus, the tax rate (and the associated publicly-provided variety, 
*G Q ) preferred by 
the median voter will be  positive only if at this tax rate (
* t ) the resulting utility for the 





,0 , 2(1)/ 2
G Q
G GaP
mt mt btQ VbV a b = - =>=   .                                        (17) 
Assuming, for the moment, that this is indeed the case we conceive that the politically 
determined tax rate and publicly-provided variety coincide with those that maximize the   12 
median voter’s utility subject to the limits imposed by the government budget constraint as 

















 Rearranging the first-order-conditions corresponding to the above program and using 
equation (5) we find two equations which (implicitly) solve for   * t and  


































                                                                     (19) 
                                              
As the reader can easily verify the comparative statics effects of changes in the in(equality) 
parameter a  on 
* t  and   
*G Q  are, in general, ambiguous. However, after extensive 
experimentation with empirically relevant parameter values (which also satisfy the second-
order conditions and inequality (17)), we find that increases in inequality result in smaller tax 
rates (albeit the effect is rather small). Figure 1 displays the median voter’s preferred tax 
rates (size of government) as a function of inequality (higher values of a imply lower 
inequality)  and  for two values of the parameter measuring the efficiency difference between 
the private and the public sector (  0.8 b =  and  1 b = ). We note that –as expected – the lower 
                                                 
5 The implication of this is that the household which will be indifferent between a privately offered and the publicly offered 
variety will have higher income than the median voter (q >m).   13 
is the efficiency of the public sector the lower is the tax rate, since in this case the cost of 
expanding public sector production at the expense of the private sector is higher
6.   
 























The explanation for the – opposite to the literature -  result that increases in equality result in 
a higher tax rate relies on the fact that the median voter in the present model must weigh the 
impact of two effects as she contemplates a rise in the tax rate in response to an increase in 
inequality. The first one is the traditional effect identified in the literature which leads to an 
increase in the tax rate preferred by the median voter as the gap between mean and median 
(pre-tax) income increases – since the median voter expects that a rise in the tax rate will 
bring to her a greater increase in public goods provision than before. But in addition to this, 
the median voter in the present paper must also take into account that a higher tax rate will 
induce some high-income households to switch their demand from a privately supplied 
variety to the publicly supplied. Accordingly, the government may not be able to use the 
                                                 
   14 
increased tax revenue to produce a variety of higher quality as it will have to provide the 
good to a higher number of households. It is thus by no means certain that a higher tax rate 
will procure the median voter (and everyone else) a higher quality of the public good. Our 
numerical results show that from the two effects mentioned  the second tends to dominate the 




The absence of a non-monotonic relationship between the tax rate and the quality of the 
publicly provided variety – due to the endogeneity of the proportion of households 
consuming this variety - is also verified by our numerical results. We find that starting from a 
low level of  a, although increases in equality produce a monotonic increase in  tax rates, 
they result initially in decreases in the quality of the publicly provided variety and then in 
higher increases it (thus producing a U-shaped relationship between equality and the quality 
of publicly provided services). This is explained by the fact that a change in the inequality 
parameter changes the proportion of households belonging to a given interval of the income 
                                                 
7 It is worth mentioning that in case the government was not involved in producing the vertically-differentiated 
product (and providing it freely to all those wishing to consume the publicly-provided variety), but was instead 
returning the tax proceeds in a lump-sum way to every household, then the median voter would prefer a tax rate 
equal to 100%. This is, of course, due to our assumption that there are no-disincentive effects of higher taxes in 
our model (see, Harms and Zink (2003)  for a review of theories suggesting mechanisms leadind to limited 
redistribution). In this sense public provision of private goods may be a relatively inexpensive way for high-
income individuals to avoid expropriation by the poor ( Roemer (1998) suggests an alternative way to avoid 
such expropriation, namely increasing the salience of some non-economic issues ).  In a fuller model, the mode 
of redistribution would itself be endogenous -  thus enhancing  the role of the agenda setting institutions in 
modern democracies (see, Persson and Tabellini (2003) for an empirical analysis of modes of governance).   15 
distribution, thus altering the number of households that choose to consume the publicly-
provided variety as the tax rate changes.  
 
4. Monopoly 
We now assume that there is a single firm producing the vertically-differentiated product. In 
order to avoid unnecessary complications regarding the nature of the political equilibrium 
(which would not help in comparing this case with the perfectly competitive one), we assume 
that this is a foreign owned monopoly – so that its owners are not citizens of the home 
country and thus do not have voting rights.  Moreover we assume that the profits accruing to 
the foreign owners are not taxed. 
 
Unlike the perfectly competitive case, in which the price of each variety was equal to the cost 
of producing it, the monopolist will choose a price-quality combination which maximizes its 
profits. We assume that the monopolist will set a single price-quality combination.  
Nevertheless, the presence of a publicly-provided variety creates a constraint (in effect 
defines the “demand curve”) for the monopolist. As previously, let 
M q  stand for the level of 
(pre-tax) income that makes a household indifferent between consuming the publicly-
provided variety (
G Q ) and the variety offered by the monopolist (
M Q ) at the price 
M P , i.e. 
((1))(1) PMMMGMG VQtPQtV qq =--=-= .                                        (20) 
Thus,  
/(1)() MMMMG PQtQQ q =--                                                                           (21) 
Equation (21) implicitly defines the proportion of households ( (/)
M b a q = ) which will 
choose to pay the price charged by the monopolist in order to avail themselves of the higher-
quality variety offered by the monopolist. Thus, the monopolist sets 
M P   and 




PQ PQb a bq P=-  , 
subject to the constraint provided by equation (21). The first-order-conditions imply that  
1











  .                                                                                                         (23)   
Equation (22) implies that the mark-up of price (
M P ) over cost (
M Q b = ) depends only on 
the (in)equality parameter a . The higher is inequality, the higher is the mark-up. Using 











.                                                                                             (24) 
In effect, equation (24) informs the median voter how her choice of the tax rate and of the 
quality of the publicly-provided good (which will be implemented by the policy maker) 
affects the proportion of households which will be consuming the variety provided by the 
monopolist. It thus summarizes for the median voter the effects of her current policy choices 
on the future behavior of the monopolist, which she takes into account when deciding – in 
effect – policy in the current period (i.e. we impose sub-game perfection). It is worth noting 
that even though –in equilibrium - the median voter will not be consuming the variety offered 
by the monopolist, she must, nevertheless, take into account the monopolist’s actions since 
these actions affect the proportion of households consuming the publicly-provided variety, 
and thus, through the government budget constraint, the feasibility of her choices. As 
explained in the previous section, the tax rate (and the associated publicly-provided variety, 
*G Q ) preferred by the median voter will be  positive only if at this tax rate (
* t ) the resulting 
utility for the median voter is higher than that which the median voter would attain if the tax 
rate was zero and was consuming the variety offered by the monopolist, i.e.    17 
*
* 1/ 1/*









= - - =>=   .         (25)             
Assuming that this condition is satisfied – this is further discussed in the following 






UbtQ a =-     ,  
subject to the government budget constraint (equation (14)) and equation (24). This 









































                                                                     (27) 
 
                                                                   
Equations (22), (23), (24), (26) and (27) determine the values of 
** ,,,
GMM tQP q and 
M Q . 
As in the perfectly competitive case, the comparative statics effects of changes in the 
in(equality) parameter a  are, in general, ambiguous. However, after extensive 
experimentation with empirically relevant parameter values (which also satisfy the second-
order conditions and inequality (25)), we find that increases in equality (rises in parameter 
a ) initially result in (small) reductions in the tax rate, which are later reversed, thus 
producing an almost  U-shaped relationship between equality and the tax rate.  Figure 2 
displays this relationship for three different values of  b  (the parameter measuring the 
efficiency difference between the private and the public sector). As expected, the lower is  b , 
the lower is –ceteris paribus- the tax rate (and the quality of the publicly-provided variety).   18 
 
























Comparing Figures 1 and 2 we see that the tax rate chosen by the median voter is higher in 
the case of monopoly
8. This is understandable since the presence of monopoly is expected to 
lead –ceteris paribus- to a larger proportion of households choosing to consume the publicly-
provided variety (than in the perfectly competitive case) because the monopolist charges a 
price larger than cost. This implies that the median voter expects that any given rise in the tax 
rate (which increases the sum available for redistribution) will add a smaller number of 
households to those already consuming the publicly-provided variety (
G Q ) in the monopoly 
case, since the income distribution is thinning at its tails. Consequently, the median voter will 
be expecting a larger rise in  
G Q  than the increase in government revenue effects in the 
monopoly case, and thus she will be willing to vote for a higher tax rate than in the 
competitive case.  One can also note that as inequality decreases (parameter a rises) the 
                                                 
8It is worth noting that the impact of monopoly on the tax rate is –ceteris paribus- quantitatively more important 
than the degree of equality, i.e. the tax rate is higher under monopoly by about two percentage points (than in 
the competitive case), but it varies less than one percentage point as the degree of inequality changes.   19 
impact of inequality on the tax rate becomes similar in the monopoly and  perfectly 
competitive cases. This is not surprising since as one can see from equation (22), an increase 
in parameter a  shrinks the monopoly mark-up of price over cost, so that the difference 
between monopolistic and perfectly competitive behaviour becomes less significant. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the political equilibrium conditions for a positive tax rate 
under perfect competition and under monopoly. One can see from conditions (17) and (20) 
that the median voter’s net utility gain from a positive tax equilibrium decreases with the 
level of inefficiency difference between the public and the private sector (parameter  b )
9 
Moreover, the value of  b  at which the median voter is indifferent between public 
consumption and private consumption (with zero tax rate) is lower for the monopoly case. 
This implies that the monopolistic setting preserves a positive tax rate equilibrium even 
though the efficiency difference between the private and the public sector would induce the 
median voter to vote for a zero tax rate if the private sector was competitive.  
       
5. Conclusion   
 In this paper we consider what happens if the government can redistribute through both sides 
of its budget (revenue and expenditure). We model this by introducing the possibility that 
high-income individuals may decide not to 
†consume” what the government is offering as a 
public good to all citizens. We find that changes in inequality do not have an unambiguous  
effect on the size of government. Our simulation results suggest that this effect will depend 
                                                 
9 The conditions under which the median voter chooses a positive tax rate, are less stringent than in the perfectly 
competitive case. With monopoly,  b  can be as low as 0.4 and still the median voter would prefer a positive tax 
rate. In the perfectly competitive case, if the degree of inequality is low, the median voter will not prefer a 
positive tax rate for  0.8 b < .   20 
on the market structure for the vertically-differentiated product. Under perfect competition 
the relationship between equilibrium tax rate and equality is positive while the relationship 
becomes U-shaped under monopoly. Moreover, the assumption of a monopolistic structure in 
the production of the vertically-differentiated good has two important consequences for the 
size of the public sector: Firstly, we find a monopoly bias in the size of government in the 
sense that under monopoly the median voter will vote for a higher tax rate. Secondly, the 
presence of monopoly induces the median voter to be in favour of  public provision of private 
goods (a positive tax rate), even in cases in which the public sector is so inefficient that under 
perfectly competitive conditions the political equilibrium would not be supportive of any 
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